Find below published papers, working papers, or work in progress by research field accompanied by a short description.

Contract theory and incentives

Optimal incentives without expected utility with Geoffrey Castillo

Incorporating deviations from expected utility due to probability distortion in a principal-agent framework leads to contract modalities that are observed in practice such as salaries, lump-sum bonuses, and option-like incentive schemes.

Moral hazard and reference-dependent preferences

I provide a unifying framework to investigate the optimal implementation of incentives under reference-dependent preferences. I show that bonus contracts emerge when agents evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point.

working paper coming soon!

Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities (Submitted)

I show that stochastic contracts with the distinctive feature that the principal adjusts the amount of risk faced by the agent are desirable under probability distortion.

The dark side of bonuses with Charles Noussair and Patricio Dalton (Submitted)

We demonstrate that incentive schemes paying incentive-compatible bonuses for the achievement of a production goal set by the loss averse agent are counterproductive.

Self-chosen goals: incentives and gender differences with Charles Noussair and Patricio Dalton

We find acute gender differences when individuals work under an incentive-compatible self-chosen goals incentive scheme. We attribute this difference to gender differences in loss aversion.

Decision theory

Who is more rational: groups or individuals? with Wieland Müller

We compare rationality in decision making under risk between groups and and individuals. As a standard for rationality we use the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences.

working paper coming soon!

Echo chambers in the laboratory with Cole Williams

We investigate whether individuals infer their type and preferences by observing other decision makers who are more similar.

working paper coming soon!

Behavioral Poverty Traps

Social status and Motivated beliefs (Submitted)

I show that social status affects economic performance by means of a psychological mechanism; one’s social standing influences beliefs about abilities, which are determinant to performance in productive tasks.

Exposure to poverty and productivity with Charles Noussair and Patricio Dalton, PLOS-One (2017)

We show that being exposed to images of extreme poverty decrease performance in a real-effort task. We use a face-reading software to show that negative emotions are mediating this effect

Methodology of Experiments

Evaluating treatment effects and replicability with Karl Schlag

We introduce a novel exact test to investigate the amount of false positives (finding a significant result when there is none and failing to replicate a paper) in the sample of Camerer et al. (2016).

working paper coming soon!