Find below published papers or most recent working papers by topic.

Contract theory and incentives

  • Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities (Submitted)

I show that stochastic contracts with the distinctive feature that the principal can adjust the amount of risk faced by the agent are desirable under probability distortion.

Incorporating deviations from expected utility emerging from probability distortions in a principal-agent setup leads to contract modalities that are often observed in practice such as fixed wages, bonus contracts, and option-like incentive schemes.

Working paper coming soon!

We demonstrate that incentive schemes paying incentive-compatible bonuses for the achievement of a goal set by the principal are counterproductive when the agent exhibits sufficiently strong loss aversion.

We find acute gender differences when individuals work under an incentive-compatible self-chosen goals incentive scheme. We attribute this difference to gender differences in loss aversion.

Decision theory

We compare rationality in decision making under risk between groups and and individuals. As a standard for rationality we use the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences, which evaluates how consistent their decision-making is.

We investigate whether individuals infer their type more efficiently by observing other decision makers who are more similar.

Working paper coming soon!

Behavioral Poverty Traps

  • Social status and Motivated beliefs (Submitted)

I show that social status affects economic performance by means of a psychological mechanism; one’s social standing influences beliefs about abilities, which are determinant to performance in productive tasks.

We show that being exposed to images of extreme poverty decrease performance in a real-effort task. We use a face-reading software to show that negative emotions are mediating this effect.

Methodology of Experiments

  • Evaluating treatment effects and replicability with Karl Schlag

We introduce a novel exact test to investigate the amount of false positives found in a sample of experimental papers published from during the last ten years in journals of the American Economic Association and in Camerer et al (2016).